|
Churubusco is an Aztec word
meaning "place of the war god." It was appropriately named. Here the
infantry faced well entrenched and fortified Mexican troops, including the
renegade "San Patricio Battalion." Duncan pushed his guns out in front of
the infantry, in what had by then become a standard tactic, in an attempt to
blow a path through the enemy formation for the U.S. infantry to pass so
they could "roll up" the Mexicans’ flanks. At 200 yards Duncan's cannons
pounded the Convent of San Mateo and its defenders (the pockmarks are still
visible on the eastern wall of the convent/fortress). Finally the defenders,
seeing they were cut off', surrendered. August 20, 1847, marked the day
Santa Anna lost two battles (Contreras and Churubusco), and lost a third of
his effective troops to defeat, desertion, capture, and casualty. The road
to the outskirts of Mexico was open.
As the American army moved toward the City of Mexico, Santa Anna had floated
rumors that he had been using the old Molino del Rey (King's mill) to
foundry cannon. Scott rose to the bait and attacked. The approach to the
Molino was guarded by a supposedly minor redoubt, the Casa de Mata, about
500 yards west of the Molino and covering the main approach to it and the
castle of Chapultepec. Duncan positioned his battery and fired on this
obstacle. The American infantry was thrown back several times suffering
heavy losses in the process. Both the Casa de Mata and Molino del Rey
eventually fell. Afterward, there was no evidence of the Molino ever having
been used as a foundry and Scott withdrew his forces from the fruits of this
hard won victory. A dispute subsequently broke out between Scott, Worth, and
Pillow as to the effectiveness of the preparatory bombardment on the Molino
and Casa de Mata. Duncan, as Worth's artillery officer, was in the middle of
the argument. This dispute, however, merely presaged the one which would
erupt between the principals after the fall of Mexico City.
At 8:00 am on September 13, 1847, the Americans stepped off against
Chapultepec. Henry Jackson Hunt, Duncan's 1st Lieutenant, pushed a section
of Battery A (comprised of a 6 pdr. gun and a 12 pdr. howitzer) to the front
of the ramparts of the capitol city. Every man and horse was hit as they
unlimbered, Hunt being wounded three times himself. Muzzle to muzzle with an
enemy cannon in an embrasure, Hunt fired first and blew the Mexican cannon
and its crew away. Down the causeway to the Garita (gate) de San Cosme Hunt
pushed his two guns. Fifty yards at a time Hunt leapfrogged his cannon until
a lodgement was secured.
On September 14, 1847, Santa Anna surrendered the city. Scott entered in
triumph, dressed in a grand manner befitting "old fuss and feathers." Worth,
Scott, and Pillow again fell to arguing with Scott over responsibility for
the attacks, losses, and retreat at Casa de Mata and Molino del Rey. A
letter reputedly written by Duncan critical of Scott was published in a
Pittsburgh, PA, newspaper. Scott had Pillow, Worth, and Duncan brought under
inquiry. Charges and countercharges flew back and forth between Mexico and
Washington, DC. There were several letters written on this and other
subjects, and the authorship of several of them remain obscure today. The
affair dragged on for some time but President Polk, who did not like the
imperious Scott and suspected him of being at least in part motivated by
presidential ambitions, eventually let the matter drop. The only real
outcome of the subsequent inquiries was that Scott was eventually replaced
as the Army commander.
In January, 1849, Colonel Croghan, who had been the Inspector General of the
Army, died. President Polk rewarded Duncan by naming him to the post. While
on an inspection trip to Mobile, Alabama, that summer, however, Duncan
contracted the vomito he had successfully avoided In Mexico and succumbed on
July 3, 1849. Ironically, Duncan's remains joined that of his former
commander, General Worth, and another artilleryman, Major Gates, both of
whom had also died recently, in a funeral cortege through New York City.
Duncan was buried in his home town and later reentered just across the
Hudson River at the United States Military Academy at West Point. His
eulogizer characterized Duncan's career as like a "meteor, not only in
brilliancy but duration."
Artillery emerged as the greatest power on the battlefield in America’s
first foreign war. Light artillery companies continually fought from exposed
positions, firing rapidly, changing positions quickly, and concentrating
their fire on selected targets. Except for the exposed position part, the
same principles have been employed from then on down through Desert Storm.
Mexican artillerymen, even though they had comparable equipment, could not
match the American's mobility and training. Mexican artillery still depended
on mules and oxen to pull their guns, and on civilian teamsters to man the
transport. American artillery units frequently split into sections,
generally two gun increments, to counterattack on separate parts of the
battlefield, only to merge again later to repel massed Mexican infantry
attacks with canister, shot, and shell on yet another part of the
battlefield. John Eisenhower in his book So Far From God stated that,
"...the field artillery made the difference between victory and defeat for
the Americans."
Duncan emerged from the war as the premier American artillerist, due in part
to the fact that he survived it, but also due to his intrepidity and
inspirational leadership. Duncan's guns were frequently well in front of the
infantry in exposed positions, attempting to secure lodgement for them.
Henry Jackson Hunt was Duncan's friend and pupil and took command of the
battery after Duncan's departure. Other renown future commanders of Battery
A, 2nd U.S. Artillery included John C. Tidball (who was the first to have
"Taps" played at a funeral on the peninsula in 1862), Alexander Pennington,
and John H. Calef, who commanded the battery at Gettysburg.
During the 1850s the Army and its artillery was once more downsized. Company
A and five of sister batteries were dehorsed by Secretary Conrad in 1852.
The next year saw Hunt on the way to Ft. Washita, Indian Territory, to mount
Company M and act as an instructional unit--two other companies having been
given a similar duty. He had left Company A in 1852 and was now in command
of Company M, 2 nd U.S. Artillery. When Hunt arrived at Ft. Washita he found
the 11 year old fort in a state of near ruin. The roofs were dilapidated and
leaky, the hospital unfit for use, the stables "insufficient and unsuitable
for the accommodation of artillery horses," the storehouses unfit, and the
magazine located in an unsafe position. It lacked, in addition, no granary,
workshops, or gunhouse. Hunt set about correcting these deficiencies. During
his stay there he had the company of several notable officers who were
either temporarily assigned to the post or visited there: Robert E. Lee,
Braxton Bragg (who resigned the Army in disgust when Company C, 3rd U.S,
Ringgold’s old battery, was again dehorsed), Joseph E. Johnson, and William
Barry.
Hunt went on to command the artillery for the Army of the Potomac. He
established procedures for the logistics and supply of the artillery which
is in large part still in use. In fact, some letters to the FA Journal
(official publication of the U.S. Field Artillery Association) after Desert
Storm commented that if the lessons that Hunt and others had taught the Army
in the Civil War had been remembered the conflict might have been "easier,"
if not shorter. The tactics and procedures laid down by nineteenth century
artillerists such as Ringgold, Duncan, Bragg, and Hunt live on in this
regard.
Click Here for more Information on
Col. James Duncan |
