NOTICE
of the approach of the Duke's army was brought
to the Prince at Culloden House shortly before
noon on Wednesday the 16th April, and he hurried
to the Moor to put the battle in array. The call
to arms had ever a charm for the Clans, and all
within reach, some from as far as Inverness,
hurried eagerly to the field, where they were
cheered by the arrival of MacDonald of Keppoch
with his men, and of a division of the Frasers
numbering about 300. About an equal number under
the Master of Lovat were on their way, but
barely reached Inverness when they met the
fugitives seeking safety in flight. Not above
5000 men mustered on this eventful day.
APPROACH OF THE DUKE'S ARMY
The English army had commenced to march as soon
as the dawning day had enabled them to break
their fast. Their course was directed along the
south side of Kildrummie Moss, and thence by the
range. of hillocks or ice-formed moraines
between that and the north side of the Loch of
the Clans and of Loch Flemington, and to the
north of Dalcross Castle. They were ordered in
three parallel divisions, each of five
battalions of foot, with a fourth column of
cavalry on the left, the artillery and baggage
following on the right. They could thus at once
be deployed into line.
The best means of matching the redoubled
broadsword of the Highlanders, — whose mode of
attack was, after a single discharge of their
firearms, to throw these weapons aside and make
a furious, and generally resistless, onset sword
in hand — had occupied the anxious attention of
military men for some time back, and the Duke
gets the credit of a truly dexterous expedient.
The soldiers of his army were instructed and
enjoined, instead of each confining himself to
his immediate opponent, to thrust with the
bayonet at the adversary of his right-hand man.
The point in this way, instead of being caught
on the round target with which the clansmen were
equipped on the left arm, holding at the same
time a dirk in the left hand, would find an
unprotected way to the sword-arm and right
breast of the foemen, all unprepared to parry so
unwonted a danger. Whether this specious
manoeuvre was really practised to any extent in
the deadly conflict does not appear. It may be
fairly doubted whether men in a death-struggle
could preserve sufficient presence of mind and
mutual reliance to intrust every man his own
well-being to the fidelity and promptness of his
left-hand man. Besides, the swordsmen and
firelock-men would not be pitted man to man, the
former requiring more elbow-room. Still the
lesson may, and is said in some instances to
have done its effectual work. A more practical
and efficacious instruction, carefully
inculcated on the soldiers, was to reserve their
fire till the attacking Highlanders should be
close at hand. The following extract from the
Duke of Cumberland's Orderly Book shows how
closely he had studied the habits of those whom
it was his lot to conquer, and marks also his
contempt for the "Lowlanders and arrant scum,"
who, he asserts, sometimes made up the lines
behind the Highlanders.
EDINBURGH, 12th January, 1745-6.
"Sunday parole, Derby. — Field-officer
for the day; to-morrow, Major Wilson. The manner
of the Highlanders' way of fighting, which there
is nothing so easy to resist, if officers and
men are not prepossessed with the lyes and
accounts which are told of them. They commonly
form their front rank of what they call their
best men, or true Highlanders, the number of
which being always but few. When they form in
battalions, they commonly form four deep, and
these Highlanders form the front of the four,
the rest being Lowlanders and arrant scum. When
these battalions come within a large musket
shots or threescore yards, this front rank gives
their fire, and immediately throw down their
firelocks and come down in a cluster with their
swords and targets, making a noise and
endeavouring to pierce the body or battalion
before them, — becoming twelve or fourteen deep
by the time they come up to the people they
attack. The sure way to demolish them is, at
three deep, to fire by ranks diagonally to the
centre, where they come, the rear rank first,
and even that rank not to fire till they are
within ten or twelve paces; but if the fire is
given at a distance, you probably will be broke,
for you never get time to load a second
cartridge, and, if you give way, you may give
your foot for dead, for they being without a
firelock, or any load, no man with his arms,
accoutrements, etc., can escape them, and they
give no quarter; but if you will but observe the
above directions, they are the most despicable
enemy that are." (Memoirs of the Jacobites, by
Mrs. Thomson, in Life of Cameron of Lochiel).
Duke of Cumberland (The
Butcher)
ORDER
OF BATTLE.
When within about two miles of the Highland
army, the Duke formed his troops in order of
battle. But the others remaining in position,
the column-formation and march were resumed, and
by and by the advancing army again formed into
line. The arrangement was highly approved by
military authorities; there being three lines,
the foremost composed of six regiments at short
intervals, the second line of five regiments
covering the open spaces and over- lapping the
contiguous regiments in front, while four
regiments in reserve formed a third line, which,
in like manner, at the outset reached across the
interstices of the second line. Each line was
three deep. The several lines were respectively
under the command of the Earl of Albemarle,
General Huske, and Brigadier Mordaunt. Two
regiments of dragoons, Lord Mark Kerr's, under
Lord Ancrum's command, and Cobham's, headed by
Generals Hawley and Bland, and accompanied by 3
portion of the Argyleshire Highlanders, and of
such of Lord Loudoun's Independent companies as
had joined (the rest of whom had charge of the
baggage) were moved to the left, with an eye to
a movement on the enemy's flank, and
a body of horse was placed
with the reserve. Eventually,
however,
the right wing becoming uncovered by reason of
the recession of some marshy ground which had
served to protect it, three of the reserve
regiments were moved, one into the front and two
into the second line, and the rest of the
cavalry, Kingston's light horse and a troop of
Cobham's, to the right flank. The portion of
marshy ground in question is apparently what
lies along a slight hollow, which from the west
joins a more perceptible marshy hollow, in the
course of the runlet percolating from the Well
of the Dead, which, threading its way in a
northerly direction, obliquely intersected the
Duke's line of march. Two field- pieces, short
6-pounders, some of which had been got through
this last-mentioned wet ground with difficulty,
as the horses stuck fast and had to be
unharnessed, and the guns dragged through by the
soldiers, were placed in each of the front open
spaces; while between the extreme regiments of
the second line, as originally composed, there
were batteries of three guns in each.
The
Prince's army was marshalled in two lines, each
also three deep, with a small reserve. There is
considerable diversity in the order of
arrangement of the component regiments as given
by different writers, and on different plans of
the battle — rather, however, as to the second
line and reserve. The chief discrepancy as to
the front line is, that some place John Roy
Stuart's regiment in it, some in the second
line; but the majority and most authoritative
assign it a place in front, where, as a Highland
regiment, it certainly ought to have been. In
the front line were the Clans in the following
order, reckoning from right to left:— The Athol
Highlanders, Camerons, Stuarts of Appin, Frasers
and Chisholms, MacIntoshes, MacLachlans and
MacLeans, Farquharsons, John Roy Stuart's
regiment, Clanranald, Keppoch and Glengarrv,
MacDonalds and MacDonells. The second line, less
numerous and compact, was most probably
composed, we are inclined after careful
consideration to conclude, in the same order, of
two small squadrons of horse, — viz., Lord
Elcho's Horse Guards and a moiety of
Fitz-James's horse (possibly, however, in or a
little behind the front line, where Home places
the horse), Lord Lewis Gordon's regiment in
column, Lord Ogilvie's, the Duke of Perth's,
Lord John Drummond's French Royal Scots, the
Irish Picquets or Brigade, and Glenbucket's
regiment in column, with Lord Balmerino's Horse
Guards on the flank. These were but a few
incomplete troops of horse altogether; and Lord
Strathallan's and Lord Pitsligo's horse,
sometimes called the Perth Dragoons, with Lord
Kilmarnock's small body of dismounted horse
grenadiers, called foot guards, formed the
reserve under Lord Kilmarnock; and with the
Prince were the remainder of Fitz-James's horse.
Some authorities substitute Lord Ogilvie's and
the Duke of Perth's regiment for the reserve,
and place the Perth Dragoons on the left of the
second line. But the difficulty of mustering
wherewithal to form a second line, seems
conclusive against placing so considerable a
body in reserve; and Home expressly states that
the cavalry had so dwindled down that none of
the horse, except Fitz-James's and the Horse
Guards, formed part of either line. Lord George
Murray commanded the right and the Duke of Perth
the left wing, with Lord John Drummond in the
centre of the front line; and the second line
was under the command of General Stapleton. The
field-pieces were placed four on either flank,
and four in the centre.
The
right wing of the Prince's army rested on the
North Park dyke, to be distinguished from the
Old Leanach dyke in continuation of it, and
extending to the Graves' Clearing, and, there is
reason to believe, continued along its south
margin as far as the Well of the Dead. The Old
Leanach dykes, which, from the east corner of
the Park dyke, round by the east side of Old
Leanach House, embraced an irregular area, shut
in on the north, excepting partially towards the
house, formed a boundary between the parishes of
Croy and Daviot, the latter surrounding, or
nearly so, this portion of the former; and the
same zig-zag line, though now obliterated, is
still the parish boundary. The old Park dyke
also formed, though its site no longer forms,
the boundary here between the counties of
Inverness and Nairn. Browne, in his "History of
the Highland Clans," s the only writer who seems
pretty distinctly to have realised the existence
and bearing of dykes other than what are called
the park or enclosure dykes. He quotes (1850,
vol. iii. p. 260) a letter of Lord George
Murray's,i addressed the day after the battle
from Ruthven
Map of the Battle - Click
for Larger Image
to
the Prince — one of the Stuart Papers — in which
he reflects on O'Sullivan, who arranged the
order of battle, for a fatal error in allowing
the enemy the walls on their left, which made it
impossible, he says, to break them or prevent
their flank-fire on the advancing Highlanders.
Browne also adds, what we elsewhere notice as
mentioned in the Lockhart Papers, that, while
the Duke was forming his line of battle, Lord
George Murray was very desirous to advance and
throw down these dykes; but the attempt appeared
too hazardous, and was not made. This must apply
to the Old Leanach dykes, which dykes, in short,
hampered, as much as the North Park dyke
protected, the Highland right wing.
The
position of both armies was operative rather for
defence than offence. Hence the indisposition on
either side to take the initiative in coming to
close quarters. The right of the Highland front
line seems to have stood opposite the east end
of the North Park dyke, as represented in Home's
plan of the battle, but must have been with an
interval between, so as to stand clear of the
interposing North Leanach dyke in front, and
much about the line of the East Park dyke, which
pointed directly to where the stables of
Culloden House now stand. The left of the
English front line would appear not to have
advanced across the marshy hollow to the north
of the Well of the Dead. Mr. Chambers says that
the English army halted at a distance of 500
paces from the Highlanders, and that, after
manoeuvring for half-an-hour with the view of
outflanking each other, the two armies at last
occupied nearly their original ground. The above
relative positions are consistent with this
statement and, considering the obliquity of the
marshy hollow to the English line of battle,
with Home's definition of the interval when,
part of the ground having become soft and boggy,
some of the artillery horses sunk — as 500 or
600 paces — all, of course, approximate
calculations. The marshy hollow proceeding from
the Well, however, runs away so much to the
north, or east of north, that the mention made
in the Duke's official report of the uncovering
of his right wing by the discontinuance of a
morass, must either have happened at a
considerably greater distance from the Rebel
army than 500 yards, as stated by him, or must
have had reference to a different portion of the
Moor, and seemingly, as has been said, to the
smaller branch marshy hollow which joins the
first from the west. Chevalier Johnstone says
that the Highlanders descended with great
rapidity into the marshy hollow, and charged
sword in hand. On the other hand, the distance
is certainly very considerable — the minimum
upwards of 400 yards a long stretch for a rapid
run, if sustained throughout, and sufficient to
put even Highlanders out of breath: a
consideration which points to the left of the
English front line having been not far from the
bottom of the marshy hollow, which is the more
likely, in that the ground rises behind on the
east more perceptibly than on the west side; so
that, if farther back, they would have had an
appreciable vantage ground, and the charge would
have been in a measure uphill, circumstances
calling for a notice which is not met with.
Leanach Cottage -
Culloden Moor
Tradition
gives a position a little west of Old Leanach
House to one of the English batteries, and
associates with it the name of Colonel Telford,
who had charge of the artillery; and this
corresponds with the battery of three guns
which, originally between the two extreme
regiments, came, owing to Wolfe's regiment being
advanced, to be quite on the left of the second
line, which was much closer to — while it at
first extended some what beyond, — the front
line than that of the Prince's army. Home says
that, when the battle began, the east dyke of
the park or enclosure was within 150 paces of
the dragoons; but, as they had no enemy
confronting them, they night safely have been
farther advanced than the infantry, and possibly
so early, with a view of securing a hold on the
Old Leanach north dyke, and in prosecution of
the purposed flank- movement. Then a little way
from the north end, the east dyke of the park
projected in the direction of the dragoons.
Wolfe's regiment, when on the extreme left of
the second line, is said to have been up to the
ankles in water. This would accord with a more
advanced position for the first line, as the
marshy ground near the well would satisfactorily
explain it. Still the state of other parts of
the ground is not to be judged by its condition
now; so that the east side of the marshy ground
there may be reasonably regarded as the position
of the left of the English front line.
OPPOSING
FORCES.
Mr. Chambers thus contrasts the appearance of
the opposing forces, as represented in a print
executed at the time:—
"The long compact lines of the British
regiments, each three men deep, extend along the
plain, with narrow intervals between; the two
flags of each regiment rising from the centre,
the officers standing at the extremities with
their spontoons in their hands, and the drummers
a little in advance beating their instruments.
The men have tri-cocked hats, long coats
resembling the modern surtout, sash belts from
which a sword depends, and long white gaiters
buttoned up the sides. The dragoons exhibit
still more superfluity of attire; their long
loose skirts flying behind them as they ride,
while their trunk square-toed boots, their
massive stirrup-leathers, their huge holster-
pistols and carabines, give altogether an idea
of dignity and strength much in contrast with
the light fantastic hussar uniform of modern
times." Of the Highlanders, dressed in the
philibeg or kilt—
"All plaided and plumed in their tartan array,"
— he says:-
"They have muskets over their left shoulders,
basket- hilted broadswords by their left sides,
pistols stuck into their girdles, and a small
pouch hanging down from their right loin,
perhaps for holding their ammunition. By the
right side of every piece of ordnance there is a
cylindrical piece of wickerwork for the
protection of the artillerymen, all of whom
appear to wear kilts like the rest."
In the Mercury newspaper, published in Edinburgh
on Tuesday, 27th May, 1746, a return is given,
as handed about, of the officers and men in each
of the 15 battalions of infantry on the day of
battle, amounting to 5521. There were, besides,
Lord Mark Kerr's and Lord Cobham's two regiments
of dragoons, the Duke of Kingston's regiment of
light horse, the Argyleshire Highlanders, and a
detachment of Lord Loudoun's men, which had been
shipped across the Firth — which would make the
Duke's army, at the lowest computation, up to
fully 7000 men, and the number has been stated
as high as 9000; while of the Prince's there is
no reason to doubt that not above 5000 could be
got together. It is elsewhere stated that the
latest returns previous to the battle, of the
rank and file of the Royal army, showed the
numerical strength to be 7179, which, with the
proper allowance for commissioned and
non-commissioned officers, would give an
aggregate of about 8000, irrespective of the
Militia and the portion of Lord Loudoun's
Independent companies. The latter figure may
therefore be pretty fairly assumed as the
probable actual force on the field.
This great disproportion, and the distressing
condition of the Mountaineers, worn out with
fatigue and weakened with hunger, were again
urged by Lord George Murray and the Highland
chiefs as pressing reasons for retiring to the
south side of the Nairn, for which there was
still ample time, thereby enabling the men to
recruit their energies, and affording
opportunity for those on the march and the
stragglers to join them. But the Prince was
obdurate. The incidents of the previous night
rankled in his breast. Distracted and hurried
must have been the brief counsel taken at that
eventful moment, and there were jealousies and
dissensions among them. The Highland chiefs
fought with a halter round their necks; while
the French and Irish confidants of the Prince,
in the service of France, felt assured, in case
of a reverse, of the privileges of ordinary
warfare; and they were behoved to be tired of
the contest, and desirous to precipitate a
crisis. Besides, we learn from the Lockhart
Papers (vol. i. p. 444) that from the very
outset
"a combination had been entered into against
Lord George Murray (who, on his joining the
Prince at Perth was declared Lieutenant-General)
by John Murray the secretary, Mr O'Sullivan, and
others. of which the Prince was acquented; but,
being an active, sturring man, and well
acquented with the situation of the country and
people, he was caressed by the Prince, and had
great weight in all the operations,
notwithstanding the opposition he met with."
There were certainly good reasons for covering
Inverness, had the means at command been
adequate. The Prince had an overweening estimate
of the irresistible prowess of the Highlanders,
whom he had on all previous occasions seen
victorious; but nothing short of supernatural
strength could have enabled them, under the
combined influences of want of sleep and food,
and the fatigue of the untoward night-march, to
cope with the fresh, well-appointed regulars who
so far outnumbered them, and who, in complete
battle array, approached in a cool, orderly,
determined manner, presaging victory. On the
other hand, the Rev. George Innes, Forres, in
his Narrative says: "The men were nodding with
sleep in the ranks " [of the Highland army]. Not
a few were actually surprised after the battle,
overcome with sleep, in the brushwood near
Culloden House, and had their throats cut. It
was nothing short of downright madness to
venture such an issue.
Culloden
Battlefield 1746
THE
CANNONADE AND MANOEUVING.
The Prince and the Duke rode along the lines, by
words and gesture animating their respective
troops. At the second halt, before moving
forward his army in line, the Duke had addressed
them in a speech of grave earnestness, befitting
the momentous issues to his father's crown
dependent on the conduct of the troops, as to
which he could not fail to have misgivings, with
Preston and Falkirk in fresh remembrance. The
artillery on both sides commenced to fire a
little after one o'clock; but that of the
Highlanders was extremely ill-served and
ill-pointed, and did little or no execution.
Their ordnance was of very small calibre, none
exceeding 4lbs. Many of the gunners had wandered
with others in search of provisions, and had not
returned, and their places had to be supplied by
men unaccustomed to such practice, while the
Duke's cannon made dreadful havoc.
Prince Charles had taken up a position behind,
and a little to the right of, the right wing, on
the farm of Culchuinag. A stone on which he
stood is still pointed out. The position was
pretty nearly in a direct line with the present
north field fence, and about 150 yards from the
west corner. While there he was bespattered with
earth ploughed up by cannonshot, and one of his
servants, holding a led horse, was killed. He
then, it is believed, retired farther back, and
took his stand, it has been said, at the
farm-house of Balvraid, beside the ash tree
already mentioned, from which the combatants
would have been completely under the eye. That
the Prince was at Balvraid, and standing beside
the ash tree, seems from the tradition to be
beyond doubt; but it is uncertain whether this
may not have been merely during a pause in the
retreat. Balvraid is rather too distant to be a
very likely position, being three-fourths of a
mile from his original one. In some accounts he
is represented to have stood far behind his
troops; but his exact whereabouts after removing
from Culchuinag is uncertain. The Duke stood
between the Royal Scots in the front and
Howard's regiment in the second line of the
right wing.
The object of both commanders seems to have been
to try to induce the other to commence the
attack, as also to gain the flank of their
opponents. In this game the numerical
superiority and better gunnery of the English
gave the Duke the advantage in both particulars.
Wolfe's regiment, which had been on the left of
the second line, somewhat outflanking the first
line, and up to the ankles in marshy ground, was
brought forward and placed on the left by the
Duke en potence that is, in advance and at right
angles to the front line, so as to enfilade the
enemy should they attack. As the hurricane of
battle seems to have swept past without any
injury to Wolfe's corps, it may be conjectured
that their position was well back and south of
the marshy hollow, where it adjoins the Well:
where, too, they would be on slightly higher
ground than the nearest combatants. The
regiments from the reserve were also moved into
the lines as already mentioned. Though the
Highland right wing reached somewhat beyond
Barrel's, the regiment on the extreme left of
the front rank of the opposing troops, the
English horse on both flanks extended beyond the
Highland army. Not only so, but the Argyleshire,
and some of Lord Loudoun's Highlanders, to the
number of 140, the rest having been left in
charge of the baggage, breaking down the eastern
and western walls of the park enclosure, made a
passage for the dragoons, who thus got and took
up a position quite past the Highland right
wing. It is obvious that this was west and south
of a hollow of some little depth, which bends
round the Culchuinag farm steading on the east
and north. James Macdonald, son of old James
Macdonald, who lived at one time at Culchuinag,
a sort of cicerone of the place, told the writer
that in ploughing between the hollow in question
and the road to the river, he turned up seven
skulls at one time — proofs of the conflict
which eventually took place at this spot. The
tenant of Balvraid and Culchuinag, Lachlan
Forbes, a person well advanced in years, whose
father came to settle in Balvraid the year after
the battle, also stated that his father told him
the west wall was broken down some distance
below the Culchuinag houses, quite as far or
farther down than the Park houses, which would
just serve to bring the troopers to the west and
south side of the hollow; and it is to be
supposed that they would have made a
considerable detour in seeking the
vantage-ground they thus gained. In the Lockhart
Papers it is remarked, that the dragoons in
their passage did not receive a shot from the
battalion inside. This shows that they had kept
well down the park. In the Mercury, 1st May,
1746, it is on the right flank of the second
line the dragoons are said to have come, whick
nearly corresponds with the above detail.
In
connection with Culchuinag a singular incident
occurred. The mother of the late old James
Macdonald, the guide above mentioned, whose
parents lived there, was baking on the day of
battle, when a poor Highlander, who had lost his
hand, rushed in and staunched the bleeding stump
by thrusting it on the hot stones of the
fire-place on the hearth.
To hold the dragoons in check, General Stapleton
detached one of Lord Lewis Gordon's regiments,
with the two squadrons of horse, on the right
flank. The dragoons did not assail the right
wing till the retreat had commenced.
THE
CHARGE.
It was a great mistake on the Prince's part to
leave the Highlanders, who had only partially
become inured to such engines of destruction, so
long exposed to the enemy's artillery, which
seriously thinned their ranks. He ought at once
to have allowed them the full benefit of their
characteristic onset. The Highlanders were
clamorous to be led to the charge. At length the
Prince did send an aide- de-camp, a young man of
the name of MacLachlan, with the requisite
orders, but he was killed on the way by a
cannon-ball. Colonel Ker of Gradyne mentions, in
his account of the battle (Lyon in Mourning, i.,
355), that he was sent by Lord George Murrayto
know if he should begin the attack, which the
Prince accordingly ordered. He adds,
"As the right was farther
Munro's Foot receives the
Highland Charge
advanced than the left, Colonel Ker went to the
left and ordered the Duke of Perth, who
commanded there, to begin the attack, and rode
along the line till he came to the right, where
Lord George Murray was." By this time the wind,
which blew from the north in the face of the
clans, was accompanied by drifting snow. Other
accounts represent Lord George to have yielded
to the general wish, and to have ordered the
charge without waiting for instructions. He did
lead the right wing to the attack, but before he
had well done so, the MacIntosh regiment broke
out from the right centre, and rushed forward to
close with the regiment opposite to them:— the
Frasers, Stuarts, Camerons, and Athol
Highlanders on the right, with the MacLachlans
and MacLeans on the MacIntoshes' left, joined in
the attack.
The
interval between the opposing armies was greater
at the north than at the south end, causing an
obliquity in the line of attack, which pointed
from the Highland left to the English left. But
the MacIntoshes swerving to the right, partly to
avoid the close fire of the 21st Scots Fusiliers
(who themselves had only some half-a-dozen
wounded), and of the field-pieces — partly, it
is conjectured, from the formation of the
ground, and the direction of an old roadway, and
the clans becoming thus crowded together — the
brunt of the conflict fell upon Munro's and
Barrel's regiments, which occupied the English
extreme left, the contending foemen feeling
rather than seeing one another, owing to the
density of the smoke. The dense massing together
of the Clans which took place by the time they
reached their foemen, is something remarkable,
and must have greatly conduced to the carnage
made among them before their favourite claymore
came into play.
The onset of the Mountaineers is thus
graphically described by Mr. Chambers:—
"It was the custom of the Highlanders before an
onset to scrug their bonnets — that is, to pull
their little blue caps down over their brows —
so as to ensure them against falling off in the
ensuing mélée. Never, perhaps, was the motion
performed with so much emphasis as on the
present occasion, when every man's forehead
burned with the desire to revenge some dear
friend who had fallen a victim to the murderous
artillery. A Lowland gentleman who was in the
line, and who survived till a late period, used
always, in relating the events of Culloden, to
comment with a feeling something like awe upon
the more than natural expression of rage which
glowed on every face and gleamed in every eye as
he surveyed the extended line at this moment.
"The action and event of
the onset were throughout quite as
dreadful as the mental emotion which
urged it. Notwithstanding that the three
files of the front line of English
poured forth their incessant fire of
musketry — notwithstanding that the
cannon, now loaded with grape- shot,
swept the field as with a hailstorm —
notwithstanding the flank-fire of
Wolfe's regiment — onward, onward, went
the headlong Highlanders, flinging
themselves into, rather than rushing
upon, the lines of the enemy, which
indeed they did not see for smoke, till
involved amid their weapons. All that
courage, all that despair, could do was
done. It was a moment of dreadful and
agonising suspense, but only a moment —
for the whirlwind does not reap the
forest with greater rapidity than the
Highlanders cleared the line.
Nevertheless, almost every man in their
front rank, chief and gentleman, fell
before the deadly weapons which they had
braved;
and
although the enemy gave way, it was not till
every bayonet was bent and bloody with the
strife "When the first line had been thus swept
aside, the assailants continued their impetuous
advance till they came near the second, when,
being almost annihilated by a profuse and
well-directed fire, the shattered remains of
what had been, but an hour before, a numerous
and confident force, began to give way. Still a
few rushed on, resolved rather to die than
forfeit their well-acquired and dearly-estimated
honour. They rushed on, but not a man ever came
in contact with the enemy. The last survivor
perished as he reached the points of the
bayonets.
"The persevering and desperate valour displayed
by the Highlanders on this occasion is proved by
the circumstance, that at one part of the plain,
where a very vigorous attack had been made,
their bodies were afterwards found in layers
three and four deep, so many, it would appear,
having in succession, mounted over a prostrate
friend to share in the same certain fate. The
slaughter was particularly great among the brave
MacIntoshes, insomuch that the heroic lady who
sent them to the field afterwards told the party
by whom she was taken prisoner, that only three
of her officers had escaped."
When the Highlanders had broken through the
first line, though sorely diminished in numbers,
they were all close together; and it was
Sempill's and Bligh's regiments alone, in the
second line, whom they vainly essayed to assail,
and whose well-directed fire completed the work
of destruction.
The Battle of Culloden
Home
says that the Athol Brigade, in advancing lost
thirty-two officers (according to Browne, twenty
three), add was so shattered that it stopped
short, and never closed with the King's troops.
This might well have been, for they had not
only, in addition to the fire in front, to
sustain the flank-fire of Wolfe's regiment, and
that of a battery of three guns in the second
line; but the troops who had broken into the
enclosure having, according to Home (though he
is apparently mistaken in this), put to the
sword the body of 100 men who had been placed
within, the Campbells (and, he should have
added, part of the Loudoun Highlanders) were
ordered to go close to the north wall and fire
on this brigade. In doing so they received a
fire which killed, he adds, two of their
captains and an ensign.
THE
CAMPBELLS GRAVES.
On either side of the junction of the present
subdividing fence with the north fence, both so
often already mentioned, there are several
graves and trenches called "The Campbells'
Graves." These are outside of the new fence.
Close to the north fence, and west of the cross
fence, there is a grave in which Mr. Arthur
Forbes and his brother, Mr. Duncan Forbes, in
1834, saw a large skeleton, the skull of which
had a musket-bullet in it, whereby it had been
pierced; and a small trench, and a little to the
east of the intersecting fence, two other
trenches, one of them larger than the others,
all in the planting, and the last a little
farther from the fence than the first. A pathway
has been made from the Culchuinag road to these,
near the dyke-side, and to the west end of the
clearing where the graves are; in proceeding to
which there is another grave a few steps from
the farthest east of the last-mentioned
trenches.
From the preliminary description of the
battlefield, it will appear that these trenches
and graves were not within the park, nor in
front of it, but the trenches are within, that
is, south (the two graves having been outside)
of the old dyke which ran along the north side
of this part of Old Leanach, after it had
crossed to the north of the line of the present
north fence. We must suppose that these
Campbells and others, only 140 in number, did
not draw up directly on the flank of the
Prince's Highlanders when in position — where,
too, they would have had to encounter those
within the park; but, after opening the way for
the dragoons to the rear, had gone back and so
placed themselves as to fire from behind the Old
Leanach dyke on the latter when going forward.
The position of these trenches and graves at
first sight would rather point to their being
part of the Highland right wing. But the
existence of the Old Leanach dyke supports the
correctness of the designation, at least in
respect of the trenches. Our informant at
Balvraid mentioned that his father told him
there were breaches in the north wall. These
were most likely made in order to the Campbells
joining in the pursuit. There is no reason to
conclude that, as sometimes stated, this wall
had been broken for attack.
CONDUCT OF THE LEFT WING.
Chevalier Johnstone says— "Overpowered by a
murderous fire in front and flank, our right
could not maintain its ground, and was obliged
to give way, while our centre had already broken
the enemy's first line and attacked the second."
Lord George Murray says that the men led by him
passed two cannon in front of the enemy's first
line, when, thinking, from his horse plunging
and rearing, that he was wounded, he quitted his
stirrups and was thrown. He then adds— "I
brought up two regiments from our second line
after this, who gave their fire, but nothing
could be done — all was lost." While this
brilliant and murderous charge was being
performed, the left wring and centre had
remained comparatively passive. It is said that
the MacDonalds had taken umbrage at not having
had the position on the right assigned to them,
which they considered their privilege since the
battle of Bannockburn; and it is added that the
Duke of Perth tried to appease them by saying,
that "if the MacDonalds behaved with their usual
valour, they would make a right of the left, and
he would henceforth call himself a MacDonald."
Mr. Chambers says— "But the insult was not to be
expiated by this appeal to clanship. Though
induced to discharge their muskets, and even to
advance some way, they never made an onset: They
endured the fire of the English regiments
without flinching, only expressing their rage by
hewing up the heath with their swords; but they
at last fled, when they saw the other Clans give
way."
This unfortunate contretemps on the part of the
MacDonalds was caused by an unseasonable claim
preferred by Lord George Murray, who alleged
that Montrose had assigned the right to the
Athol Highlanders. The Prince declined to decide
on a matter on which he felt imperfectly
informed. He, however requested the MacDonald
chiefs to concede the point on this occasion,
which they agreed to do; but their followers
were not reconciled to the arrangement.
In the account of the battle drawn up by order
of the Duke of Cumberland, it is stated "that
upon the right, where his Royal Highness had
placed himself, imagining the greater push would
be made there, they came down three several
times within 100 yards of our men, firing their
pistols and brandishing there swords." This was
by way of bravado, not an inchoate attack; no
movement had been then ordered; but with the
view of provoking the enemy to commence, as each
was desirous the other should do. Much allowance
must be made for men who, jaded with fatigue and
want of sleep and nourishment, could scarce have
been themselves. It is stated by the Rev. George
Innes, in his Narrative, that "in advancing Lord
George Murray had inclined a good deal to the
right, probably to avoid being flanked by the
dragoons; but this occasioning a gap towards the
left, the MacDonald were in danger of being
surrounded, which made them stop till the Duke
of Perth's and Glenbucket's [query, Lord
Ogilvie's or Lord John Drummond's ?] regiments
were drawn forwards from the second line to make
up the line." There was nothing to dread from
the dragoons, who by this time had gone to
Culchuinag. But if the bend of the line of the
Old Leanach dyke had caused the right wing in
its advance to incline at first to the left, it
would have required to spread out again to the
right in order to confront Barrel's regiment on
the extreme English left, and we have seen that
the MacIntoshes also made their way left
shoulders forward. The Highlanders, too, were
outflanked on the left by Kingston's light
horse. The crowding together of the clans, and
the consequent concentration of the attack on
two regiments, seems to imply that, while the
MacIntoshes swerved to the right, the others
must have inclined at first to the left, and the
whole to have jostled one another.
Had the right been able to maintain their ground
a very few minutes longer, doubtless the warlike
instinct of the MacDonalds would have led them
con amore into the mélée. It was not, however, a
moment for indecision, but one where to doubt
was to be lost; and when they saw those who had
attacked sword in hand driven back, they also
retired. The right centre front line, which had
charged, ought to have been supported by the
second line. But their annihilation, the recoil
of the right wing, and the appearance of the
enemy's horse in position in their rear, were
quite sufficient to paralyse the outnumbered
insurgents, and no wonder that they gave way. A
party of cavalry pressed upon the MacDonalds
when retiring to the second line, but was
repulsed by spirited fire from the Irish
picquets.
CONDUCT
OF THE PRINCE
The Prince was not wanting in will and
resolution to do whatever might be done to
retrieve the fortunes of the day. He was eager
to put himself at the head of his remaining
troops and to charge the enemy; but his
attendants saw that the rout was complete, and
they compelled him to quit the field. A cornet
in his service, when questioned upon this
subject at the point of death, declared that he
saw O'Sullivan, after using entreaties in vain,
turn the head of the Prince's horse and drag him
away. (Chambers's History of the Rebellion, and
Quarterly Review, No. 71).
All testimony concurs in doing justice to the
Prince's conduct, with exception of Chevalier
Johnstone and Lord Elcho. The former taunts him
with contenting himself, when the dragoons and
the Campbells were breaking through the
enclosure, with sending repeated messages to
Lord George Murray to counteract this important
movement by placing troops within the enclosure
— which orders were not attended to — instead of
putting himself at the head of his troops and
charging in person; while Lord Elcho asserts
that, after the right wing had given way, he had
in vain entreated Charles still to retrieve the
fortunes of the day with the left wing, and by
rallying the others; and that on his not
advancing to do so, —
Charles Edward Stuart
in
compliance with the advice of all others about
him — he, Lord Elcho, called him an Italian
scoundrel, and declared he would never see his
face more. As to the first, the Chevalier Tote
under the influence of disappointment and ill
humour; and it is absurd to suppose that, with
the handful of horse the Prince had about him,
any successful attempt could have been made to
resist the English squadrons and Argyleshire and
Loudoun Highlanders. He did what he could, and
what the occasion called for, in sending such
orders. For that matter there had been, as above
mentioned, a small body of men placed within the
enclosure.
If there be any truth in the messages, it would
seem to demonstrate that the Prince had at the
time been at some considerable distance. If near
at hand, it would be idle to communicate with
Lord George, as it was only from the second line
the manoeuvre could have been counteracted. Lord
George could do nothing owing to the flanking
dyke, and he had enough on his hands. The only
practical expedient was that adopted by General
Stapleton; only, one would think, had Lord Lewis
Gordon's regiment and the few available horse
been moved up with celerity, they might have
given a good account of the dragoons as they
pressed through the gap in the west wall. But
the supposed distance of this gap, and the dip
of the ground, would have screened the
operation.
As to the other charge, asserted want of
resolution, as has been remarked (Quarterly
Review, No. 71), "it is nothing new for a warm
and impetuous soldier like Lord Elcho, rendered
desperate by circumstances, to give counsel on a
field of battle which it would be madness in any
general to adopt." Lord Mahon says, "that Lord
Elcho was a man of most violent temper, and no
constant fidelity;" and it is certain that he
was one of the foremost of the Prince's train on
the occasion of his first public audience at the
Court of France after his return. Chevalier
Johnstone places the altercation in a cabin on
the south side of the Nairn, in the course of
the retreat, and says that the contention had
respect to the continued prosecution of the
warfare; and Lord Elcho, writing after an
interval, may have made a mistake as to time and
place. In fact, Lord Elcho was one of those who
rode from the field with the Prince. Then, "as
for rallying the Highlanders, why, they were
Highlanders, and for that very reason could not
be rallied. In their advances they fired their
guns and threw them away, coming to the shock
with broadsword and target alone, if they
succeeded, which they often did, no victory
could be more complete; but they exhausted their
strength in this effort, and it was not till
they received, in the regiments drawn from
amongst them, the usual discipline of the field,
that Highlanders had any idea of rallying, till
some hill, pass, or natural fastness gave them
an advantage." (Quarterly Review, No. 71, and
General Stewart of Garth's History of the
Highland Regiments). The charge of want of
courage is quite inconsistent with the Prince's
antecedents, and with his behaviour during his
subsequent wanderings.
The English accounts represent that "the
cavalry, which had charged from the right and
left, met in the centre." This was not, however,
till the Prince's forces had begun to move off
the ground. The Duke's foot regiments had been
ordered to stand upon the ground where they had
fought, and to dress their ranks. It was not
till they had recovered from the rough handling
that they had received that the Duke advanced
with his infantry, when the Highlanders began to
separate; some in small parties, but the mass in
two bodies; the larger of which directed their
course towards the hills, but obliquely past
Balvraid, to a point some miles up the river;
the others taking the open road to Inverness.
Then the cavalry from both wings did meet, and
commenced the pursuit.
"Yet," in the words of Lord Mahon, " let it not
be deemed that even then their courage failed.
Not by their forefathers at Bannockburn; not by
themselves at Preston or Falkirk; not in after
years, when discipline had raised and refined
the valour of their sons, not on the shores of
the Nile; not on that other field of victory
where their gallant chief, with a prophetic
shroud (it is their own superstition) high upon
his breast, addressed to them only these three
words 'Highlanders, remember Egypt!' — not in
those hours of triumph and of glory was
displayed a more firm and resolute bravery than
now in the defeat at Culloden. The right and
centre had done all that human strength or human
spirit could do; they had yielded only to
necessity and numbers; and, like the captive
monarch at Pavia, might boast that everything
was lost but their honour."
INDIVIDUAL HEROISM.
Several instances of individual heroism and self
devotion stand out prominently in the gloomy
record of this disastrous day. The death of
MacDonald of Keppoch, a genuine descendant of a
race distinguished for the pertinacity with
which they persisted in holding their lands in
Lochaber by the tenure of the sword instead of
the sheepskin, is very touching. When his
clansmen offered to turn their backs, the chief,
with an exclamation of anguish, stepped forward
with a pistol in one hand and a drawn sword in
the other. He got but a little way when a
musket-shot brought him to the ground; a
clansman raised him up, and beseeched him not to
throw his life away, and to let him assist him
still to join his retreating regiment. Keppoch
desired his faithful follower to take care of
himself-; and, again essaying to reach the
enemy, he received another shot, and fell to
rise no more.
"The late Mr. MacDonald of Glenaladale told me,"
says the Rev. Donald MacIntosh, usually styled
Bishop MacIntosh, in a MS. dated in 1810, "some
years ago, that he saw John Mor MacGilvra, major
of the MacIntoshes, a gun-shot past the enemy's
cannon, and that he was surrounded by the
reinforcements sent against the MacIntoshes;
that he killed a dozen men with his broadsword,
while some of the halberds were run into his
body. When Cumberland heard of it, he said he
would have given a great sum of money to have
saved his life." John Mor was a very large man,
and popularly known as "John of the Markets."
Almost all the leaders and front-rank men of the
regiments that charged, sealed their devotedness
with their blood. MacGillivray of Dunmaglass,
who commanded the MacIntoshes, was killed in the
action, with the lieutenant-colonel, the major,
and all the officers of the regiment excepting
three. Dunmaglass was, after the battle, carried
to the well hard by, already alluded to, beside
which he breathed his last, and which has since
been sometimes also called "Dunmaglass's Well."
A woman from a neighbouring house recognised the
body of MacGillivray of Dalcrombie, and bound a
handkerchief round the arm, that it might be
identified. The remains were interred in Petty
Churchyard. In the Statistical Account of that
parish is the following passage:—
"It is said that after the battle his
(Dunmaglass's) body, with fifty others, was
thrown into a pit, and that, so far did the
king's troops carry their animosity, that for
six weeks they guarded the field, and would not
grant the consolation to his friends of placing
the body in the family burying-ground. At the
end of that period, it is said that, by pouring
some ankers of whisky into the opened grave, it
was found possible to remove the body to the
Churchyard of Pettie."
MacLachlan, colonel of the united regiment of
MacLachlans and MacLeans, was killed by a cannon
ball; and MacLean of Drummin, the
lieutenant-colonel, who, being told that two of
his sons had fallen, turning back with the
exclamation, "It shall not be for nought!" was
killed by a random shot. Lochiel was wounded
with grape shot in both ankles, but his two
brothers carried him off. Charles Fraser,
younger of Inverallochy, lieutenant-colonel of
the Frasers, was mortally wounded. The Master of
Lovat was not present. The battle is said to
have lasted only about forty minutes, the
greater part of which was occupied with distant
cannonading. Viscount Strathallan and the Laird
of Aldie were the only persons of note attached
to the Lowland regiments who were killed. The
former is stated in the Mercury to have been so
by Lieutenant-Colonel Howard.
What is said to be Keppoch's Grave is on the
east side of a boulder-stone on the Moor, 120
paces north of the plantation, and about 200
paces north of the road, and will be found in a
straight line entering the plantation, 100 yards
west of the Graves. There is another grave 100
paces to the east, beside a well, and various
other graves are scattered over the Moor. As the
Keppoch MacDonalds were the last but one clan on
the left, the extreme left of the Highlanders
may have been not far from a straight drain cut
on the Moor, a little north of Keppoch's Grave,
and running to the south-west, which is joined
by another on the west side of the croft
farmhouse.
Owing to the angular disposition of the various
lines of the fences, roads, and planting, one is
prone, judging by Keppoch's Grave, to deem the
line of battle very circumscribed. But on
further examination this difficulty in great
measure disappears. Supposing the line of the
old East Park dyke prolonged to this drain, the
distance from the north or north-east angle of
the Park to the drain, about 280 yards from the
junction with the other drain, would be 500
yards. The space now allowed for soldiers in
line is 20 inches; Highlanders wielding the
claymore would require much more freedom. But
even at 30 inches to each man, 500 yards would
about suffice for a body of 2000 men ranged
three deep. There would have been more out of
5000 in the front line. But a little
prolongation beyond the drain, or curtailment of
the individual spaces, adjusts the relations;
even taking into account a probable interval
between the extreme right and the old Park dyke,
in respect of the protrusion of the Old Leanach
dyke. The greater compactness of the lines of
the regulars, and the more sparse formation of
the Prince's second column, serve to demonstrate
the disparity of the opposing forces. There is,
as mentioned, a conspicuous protruding boulder
to the west or north-west behind the Stable
Hollow cottage, next to King's Stables, where a
cannon is said to have been planted. The line of
the old East Park dyke, prolonged, would pass
within 120 yards of the stone, which, however,
is about 1000 feet from the supposed point of
intersection of the ditch. From Keppoch's Grave,
if so disposed, one may strike right across to
the hollow already described on the edge of the
wood, where the Highland army had encamped, or
rather bivouacked, and thence through the wood
to emerge near the dog kennel.
Mass graves of the Clans
at Culloden
THE
GRAVES.
The principal collection of graves or trenches
occupies a space of 130 yards by 25, of extreme
breadth, in the line of the charge, and across
that of the English army. . They are
distinguished in succession, reckoning from the
west, as "Clan Fraser," "Mixed Clans;" "Clan
MacIntosh;" "Clan Cameron;" "Clan MacGillivray;"
"Clan Stuart of Appin;" "Clans MacGillivray,
MacLean, MacLachlan, Athol Highlanders." The
bodies of the several clansmen could have been
readily distinguished by the dress; and country
people were employed in the work of interment.
Dr. Charles Fraser MacIntosh of Drummond,
mentions, in his Antiquarian Notes (No. 96),
that when he lived at Gollanfield, in Petty, an
old man of ninety, curiously styled and known,
as he remarks, as "John Oig" (young John), told
him that he had known one Paul MacPhail in
Ballenreich, who, the day
after
the battle, helped to cut the big trench where
so many were interred. His informant had also
known "Donuilna Braiteach" (Donald of the
Colours), so named for his having, when the
MacIntosh ensign was killed, stripped the
colours from the colour- staff, and, wrapping
them round his body, escaped from the field. The
English dead were buried in the field round Old
Leanach, which is still called the Field of the
English. In it bones have been again and again
turned up by the plough.
The simple headstones distinguishing the graves
were erected about 1880 by the late Mr Duncan
Forbes of Culloden, and similarly inscribed
slabs of stone mark the positions of the "King's
Stables," "Well of the Dead," and "Field of the
English." The present monumental cairn dates
from the same period, taking the place of a rude
pile of stones collected in 1858. The cairn
bears the inscription:
THE BATTLE OF CULLODEN
WAS FOUGHT ON THIS MOOR
16TH APRIL, 1746.
THE GRAVES OF THE
GALLANT HIGHLANDERS
WHO FOUGHT FOR
SCOTLAND AND PRINCE CHARLIE
ARE MARKED BY THE
NAMES OF THEIR CLANS.
It
is particularly requested that parties visiting
the field of battle will not in any way destroy
or dig up the graves. Too much of this has been
done; and it is hoped that as, by means of the
present Guide, every object of interest has been
pointed out, proper respect may be henceforth
shown to the last resting-place of many a brave
Highlander.
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